A Tentative Role for FOXP2 in the Evolution of Dual Processing Modes and
  Generative Abilities by Chrusch, Courtney & Gabora, Liane
A Tentative Role for FOXP2 in the Evolution of Dual Processing Modes and 
Generative Abilities 
 
Courtney Chrusch (courtney_chrusch@hotmail.com) and Liane Gabora (liane.gabora@ubc.ca) 
Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia 
Arts Building, 333 University Way, Kelowna BC, V1V 1V7, CANADA  
 
Abstract 
It has been suggested that the origins of cognitive modernity in 
the Middle/Upper Paleolithic following the appearance of 
anatomically modern humans was due to the onset of dual 
processing or contextual focus (CF), the ability to shift 
between different modes of thought: an explicit mode 
conducive to logical problem solving, and an implicit mode 
conducive to free-association and breaking out of a rut. 
Mathematical and computational models of CF supported this 
hypothesis, showing that CF is conducive to making creative 
connections by placing concepts in new contexts. This paper 
proposes that CF was made possible by mutation of the 
FOXP2 gene in the Paleolithic. FOXP2, once thought to be the 
“language gene”, turned out not to be uniquely associated with 
language. In its modern form FOXP2 enabled fine-tuning of 
the neurological mechanisms underlying the capacity to shift 
between processing modes by varying the size of the activated 
region of memory.  
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Introduction  
The realization that FOXP2 was not the “language gene” 
generated much-needed sober discussion about the 
simplicity of single-gene explanations of complex traits. 
However, if one finds a relatively simple explanation that is 
consistent with a wealth of data from multiple disciplines, it 
is parsimonious to start with that and see if it needs to be 
modified or elaborated. We suggest that while FOXP2 is not 
the ‘language gene’ it may have a broad but well-defined 
impact on cognition. This paper synthesizes genetic, 
neurological, cognitive, and anthropological research into an 
integrated account of the cognitive changes underlying 
behavioral modernity, including language, came about. 
Specifically, we propose that it enabled the onset of 
contextual focus—the ability to shift between explicit / 
analytic and implicit / associative modes of thought—which 
paved the way for not just language, but a range of cognitive 
abilities considered by anthropologists to be diagnostic of 
behavioral modernity. 
First we place the discussion in its historical context by 
reviewing both the studies that implicated the FOXP2 gene 
in the evolutionary origins of language, and the evidence that 
caused this connection to come into question. Second, we 
review anthropological and archaeological evidence that the 
coming into prominence of creative and cognitive abilities 
(including but not limited to those that involve language) 
coincides with the evolutionary origins of FOXP2. Third, we 
review literature on dual processing theories and generative 
abilities. Finally, we synthesize these literatures in a new 
explanation of the role of FOXP2 in language specifically 
and cognitive development more generally. 
The Search for a Genetic Basis for Language 
FOXP2 is a transcription gene on chromosome 7 (Reimers-
Kipping et al., 2011). It regulates the activity of other genes 
that play a role in the development and function of the brain 
(Fisher & Ridley, 2013; Kovas & Plomin, 2006). It is 
associated with proper functioning of the motor cortex, the 
striatum, and the cerebellum, which controls fine motor 
skills (Liegeois, Morgan, Connelly, & Vargha-Khadem, 
2011). It was proposed that the FOXP2 gene plays an 
important role in language acquisition when a mutation in 
this gene was associated with language impairment in a 
British Family known as the KE Family (Lai, Fisher, Hurst, 
Vargha-Khadem, & Monaco, 2001). Approximately half the 
members of this family, across several generations, exhibited 
verbal dyspraxia and severe difficulty in controlling the 
orofacial muscles required for speech articulation 
(Lalmansingh, Karmakar, Jin, & Nagaich, 2012). The family 
was diagnosed with Specific Language Impairment: a 
significant deficit in language development that exists 
despite adequate educational opportunity and normal 
nonverbal intelligence (Lai et al., 2001; Morgan, 2013). 
Those affected by SLI show deficits to the articulation of 
speech sounds, verbal expression, comprehension of speech, 
and have trouble controlling the movement and sequencing 
of orofacial muscles resulting in deficits in fluent speech. 
Transcript sequencing showed that a mutation of FOXP2 
widespread in the KE family results in language deficiencies 
(Lai et al., 2001). FOXP2 thus became prematurely referred 
to as the “language gene” (Bickerton, 2007). 
However, from the start there was question concerning its 
involvement in language because as a transcription gene it 
only has an indirect effect on neural structure or behavior 
(Bickerton, 2007; Reimers-Kipping et al., 2011). Moreover, 
although FOXP2 is involved in motor control and learning, 
there ae indications that it has a role in other abilities that do 
not involve language (Kurt, Fisher, & Ehret, 2012). Indeed, 
the KE Family demonstrated minor non-verbal disabilities 
such as lack of cognitive fluidity, and below-average IQ (Lai 
et al., 2001). It was concluded that the neurological basis of 
deficits associated with FOXP2 lie in the structural and 
functional abnormalities of cortico-striatal and cortico-
cerebellar circuitries of the brain, which are important for 
learning, memory, and motor control, not language 
exclusively. 
Language is likely a polygenic trait (Chabris et al., 2012; 
see Kovas & Plomin, 2006). It is difficult to identify all the 
genes that contribute to an ability as complex as language; 
this is the problem of “missing heritability” (Manolio et al., 
2009). Moreover, a gene such as FOXP2 may be pleiotropic 
in its effects, i.e., it may affect multiple traits (Kovas & 
Plomin, 2006). Nevertheless, it is well established that a 
small change or perturbation can percolate through a system 
resulting in massive, large-scale changes, a phenomenon 
known as self-organized criticality (Bak, Tang, & 
Wiesenfeld, 1987). Self-organized criticality plays an 
important role in gene expression, particularly in the case of 
regulatory genes (Kauffman, 1993). This makes it worth at 
least considering the possibility that FOXP2 plays a role in 
cognition that extends beyond its role in language and yet is 
nonetheless clear-cut and identifiable. 
Imitation and the Evolution of Language 
Evidence that FOXP2 is actively transcribed in brain areas 
where mirror neurons are present led to the hypothesis that 
FOXP2 made language possible through its effect on the 
capacity to imitate (Corballis, 2004a). Two simple forms of 
imitation are: (1) onomatopoeia, in which a speaker refers to 
something by making a sound that phonetically resembles it 
(e.g., referring to the sound made by a frog as “ribbit”), and 
(2) interjections, which may have begun with sounds such as 
the smacking of the mouth and lips during hunger. It has 
long been thought that onomatopoeia and interjections paved 
the way for more complex vocalizations (Chomsky, 1975; 
Farrar, 1866). The idea that imitation precipitated language 
was strengthened by findings that mirror neurons play a key 
role in language development (Arbib, 2011). However, the 
role of mirror neurons is controversial and the evidence for 
transcription of FOXP2 in areas where they are present is 
disputed. Moreover, in order to imitate the language of 
others there must already be others who are using language. 
Therefore, if FOXP2 played a role in the origin of language 
this is not fully accounted for by the mediating role of 
imitation. Moreover, the hypothesis that FOXP2 affects 
language by way of its effect on imitation does not explain 
the existence of defects associated with FOXP2 mentioned 
earlier that involve neither language nor imitation. Finally, 
imitation, but not grammatical, syntactically rich language, 
is seen in other species. In short, FOXP2 does not appear to 
affect language solely through its effect on imitation. 
The Cultural Explosion of the Middle-Upper 
Paleolithic 
FOXP2 underwent accelerated evolution approximately 
200,000 years ago (Corballis, 2004b; Lai et al., 2001). 
Within the last 200,000 years it underwent at least two 
human-specific mutations (Morgan, 2013; Lai et al., 2001). 
This corresponds to the appearance of anatomically modern 
humans in the fossil record between 200,000 and 100,000 
years ago (Lai et al., 2001). It has been proposed that the 
appearance of anatomically modern humans was due to 
amino acid substitutions that differentiate the human FOXP2 
gene from that of chimpanzees (Enard et al., 2002; Zhang et 
al., 2002). At least one FOXP2 mutation occurred within the 
last 100,000 years (Lai et al., 2001). This aligns FOXP2 
change with the onset of behavioral modernity including 
complex language. Anatomical modernity preceded 
behavioral modernity; Leakey (1984) writes of anatomically 
modern human populations in the Middle East with little in 
the way of culture, and concludes, “The link between 
anatomy and behavior therefore seems to break” (p. 95). 
The origin of complex language is widely associated with 
what Mithen (1998) refers to as the ‘big bang’ of human 
culture. The European archaeological record provides 
extensive evidence of an unparalleled cultural transition 
occurred between 60,000 and 30,000 years ago, at the onset 
of the Upper Paleolithic. Considering it “evidence of the 
modern human mind at work,” Leakey (1984:93-94) 
describes this period as “unlike previous eras, when stasis 
dominated, ... [with] change being measured in millennia 
rather than hundreds of millennia.” This period exhibits 
more innovation than in the previous six million years of 
human evolution (Mithen, 1998). It marks the beginnings of 
traits considered diagnostic of behavioral modernity, 
including a more organized, strategic, season-specific style 
of hunting involving specific animals at specific sites, 
elaborate burial sites indicative of ritual and religion, 
evidence of dance, magic, and totemism, colonization of 
Australia, and replacement of Levallois tool technology by 
blade cores in the Near East. In Europe, complex hearths and 
art appeared, including cave paintings of animals, decorated 
tools and pottery, bone and antler tools with engraved 
designs, ivory statues of animals and sea shells, and personal 
decoration such as beads, pendants, and perforated animal 
teeth, many of which may have indicated social status. 
Whether this period was a genuine revolution culminating 
in behavioral modernity is hotly debated because claims to 
this effect are based on the European Paleolithic record, and 
largely exclude the African record (Fisher & Ridley, 2013). 
Many artifacts associated with a rapid transition to 
behavioral modernity 40-50,000 years ago in Europe are 
found in the African Middle Stone Age tens of thousands of 
years earlier, which pushes the cultural transition more 
closely into alignment with the transition to anatomical 
modernity and the associated changes to FOXP2. What is 
clear is that modern behavior appeared in Africa between 
100,000 to 50,000 years ago, and spread, resulting in 
displacement of the Neanderthals in Europe (Fisher & 
Ridley, 2013). From this point on there was only one 
hominid species: modern Homo sapiens. Despite a lack of 
overall increase in cranial capacity, the prefrontal cortex, and 
more particularly the orbitofrontal region, increased 
significantly in size, in what was most likely a time of major 
neural reorganization (Morgan, 2013). 
Thus, a period of significant FOXP2 evolution overlaps 
with both the transition to anatomical modernity and the 
cultural transition of the Middle-Upper Paleolithic. This 
suggests that that FOXP2 may have played a role in the 
onset of modern human cognitive abilities.  
Contextual Focus as Explanation for the 
Creative Explosion 
We have seen evidence that FOXP2 plays a role in the 
evolution of complex cognitive abilities including language 
but this relationship is not solely mediated through its effects 
on the capacity for imitation. We now provide the necessary 
background to consider an alternative scenario. 
It has been proposed that the Paleolithic transition reflects 
fine-tuning of the capacity to subconsciously shift between 
different modes of thought (Gabora, 2003 Gabora & 
Kaufman, 2010; Gabora & Kitto, 2013). The ability to shift 
between different modes was referred to as contextual focus 
(CF) because it requires the ability to focus or defocus 
attention in response to the context or situation one is in. CF 
is in some ways similar to the notion of dual processing, 
according to which we use explicit cognition for conscious 
analysis of the task at hand, and implicit cognition for free 
association and quick ‘gut’ responses (Evans, 2008; 
Frankish, 2011; Nosek, 2007; Willingham & Goedert-
Eschmann, 1999). The creativity literature makes a similar 
distinction between (1) divergent or associative processes 
during idea generation, while (2) convergent or analytic 
processes predominate during the refinement, 
implementation, and testing of an idea (Finke, Ward, & 
Smith, 1992). Associative thought maps onto implicit 
cognition, while analytic thought maps onto explicit 
cognition (see Sowden, Pringle, & Gabora, in press, for a 
comparison and discussion of the relationship dual 
processing theory and dual theories of creativity). 
The proposal then is that the onset of CF in the Paleolithic 
was made possible through fine-tuning of the biochemical 
mechanisms underlying the capacity to shift between these 
modes, depending on the situation, by varying the specificity 
of the activated memory region (Gabora, 2003). Defocused 
attention, by diffusely activating a wide region of memory, 
is conducive to associative thought; it enables obscure (but 
potentially relevant) aspects of the situation to come into 
play. It is useful for the generation of new connections when 
one is stuck in a rut. Focused attention is conducive to 
analytic thought; memory activation is constrained enough 
to hone in and perform logical mental operations on the most 
clearly relevant aspects. It is reasonable that one or more 
genes would have been involved in the fine-tuning of the 
biochemical mechanisms underlying the capacity to 
subconsciously shift between these two processing modes. 
Regions consisting of many cell assemblies participate in the 
encoding of more memories than regions containing few. 
Formal Models of Contextual Focus 
The hypothesis that CF is responsible for the burst of 
innovation in the Paleolithic is supported by formal models 
of CF. A mathematical model of CF was developed (Gabora 
& Aerts, 2009), and a version of this model was consistent 
with experimental data from a study in which participants 
were asked to rate the typicality of exemplars of a concept 
for different contexts (Veloz, Gabora, Eyjolfson, & Aerts, 
2011). Introducing measures of state robustness and context 
relevance, the modeled showed that a shift to a more 
associative processing mode (by varying the exemplar 
typicality threshold) is accompanied by changes in the 
relevance of different contexts, such that seemingly atypical 
states of the concept can become typical states. This result is 
important because viewing a familiar concept from a new 
context and thereby making new connections is the essence 
of creativity; it underlies not just the generativity of 
language but the characteristically human ability to adapt old 
ways to new circumstances. 
The effect of CF at the level of society was investigated 
using a computational model of cultural evolution consisting 
of an artificial society of neural-network based agents that 
invent and imitate ideas for cultural outputs. CF was 
introduced into an artificial society by giving agents the 
capacity to shift between different processing modes 
depending on the effectiveness of their current cultural 
output (Gabora & Firouzi, 2012). The fitness of cultural 
outputs was significantly higher with CF than without it, as 
shown in Figure 1. The diversity, or number of cultural 
outputs, showed the typical pattern of an increase as the 
space of possibilities is explored followed by a decrease as 
agents converge on the fittest outputs. However, with CF, 
this occurs more quickly, and although early in a run 
diversity is lower with CF (because agents more quickly 
hone in on superior cultural outputs) in the long run diversity 
is higher, as shown in Figure 2 (because a greater number of 
superior cultural outputs are found). Together, Figures 1 and 
2 show that the onset of CF provides a computationally 
feasible explanation for how the increased utility and variety 
of artifacts in the Middle/Upper Paleolithic came about. 
The Neurological Basis of Contextual Focus 
To see why the onset of CF could reasonably be attributed to 
fine-tuning at the neurological level and give rise to a 
Paleolithic burst of creativity we need to examine the 
features of associative memory that allow creative 
connections to be made. The notion that diffuse activation is 
conducive to associative thought while activation of a 
narrow receptive field is conducive to analytic thought is 
consistent with the architecture of associative memory 
(Gabora, 2000; Gabora & Ranjan, 2012). Memories are 
encoded in neurons that are sensitive to ranges (or values) of 
microfeatures (Churchland & Sejnowski, 1992). Each 
neuron responds maximally to a particular microfeature and 
responds to a lesser extent to related microfeatures, an 
organization referred to as coarse coding  (Hubel & Wiesel, 
1965). An item in memory is distributed across cell 
assemblies that contain many neurons; each neuron 
participates in the storage of many items (Hinton, 
McClelland, & Rumelhart, 1986). Memory is also content 
addressable: there is a systematic relationship between the 
content of a representation and the neurons where it gets 
encoded. Thus representations that get encoded in 
overlapping regions of memory share features, and 
representations can be evoked by stimuli that are similar or 
“resonant” in some (perhaps context-specific) way (Hinton, 
McClelland, & Rumelhart, 1986; Marr, 1969).  
 
Figure 1. The mean fitness of cultural outputs generated by 
agents in a computational model of cultural evolution was 
higher in agents with CF (those with the ability to shift 
between different processing modes). 
 
Figure 2. Figure 1. The diversity of cultural outputs 
generated by agents with CF increases more quickly and 
stabilizes at a higher value than for agents without CF. 
 
These properties of associative memory—distributed 
representation, coarse coding, and content addressability—
make possible both the capacity to stay on task during 
analytic thought, and the forging of unusual yet relevant 
connections during associative thought (Gabora, 2000; 
Gabora & Ranjan, 2012). Each thought may activate more or 
fewer cell assemblies depending on the nature of the task at 
hand. Focused attention is conducive to analytic thought 
because memory activation is constrained enough to zero-in 
and specifically operate on the most defining properties. 
Defocused attention, by diffusely activating a diversity of 
memory locations, is conducive to associative thought; 
obscure (but potentially relevant) properties of the situation 
come into play. Thus while in an analytic mode of thought 
the concept TOOL might only activate a hand axe, the most 
commonly used tool, in an associative mode of thought, all 
sorts of items in one’s environment might be viewed as a 
potential tool depending on what one wants to accomplish. 
Once it was possible to shift between these modes of 
thought, cognitive processes requiring either analytic 
thought, associative thought or both could be carried out 
more effectively, and indeed the fruits of one mode of 
thought could become ingredients for the other mode, 
thereby facilitating the forging of a richly integrated internal 
model of the world. Hence we propose that the Paleolithic 
transition reflects a mutation to FOXP2 that caused fine-
tuning of the capacity to spontaneously shift between 
associative and analytic modes depending on the situation by 
varying the specificity of the activated memory region.  
The Evolutionary Origins of Contextual Focus 
We now present our argument for how FOXP2 made 
possible the explosion of creativity and onset of language in 
the Middle / Upper Paleolithic. Amino acid substitutions that 
differentiate the human genome FOXP2 gene from that of 
chimpanzees led to the appearance of anatomically modern 
humans. This genetic modification changed the functioning 
of neurons in the basal ganglia that contribute to cognitive 
flexibility. These neurons show greater synaptic plasticity 
and dendrite length in humans compared to chimpanzees. 
These changes enhanced the efficiency of neural cortico-
basal ganglia circuits in the human brain. It enabled 
individuals to modulate the degree of cognitive flexibility by 
spontaneously adjusting how much detail of any given 
thought or experience impact associative memory. Humans 
became able to shift between focused and defocused modes 
of attention, and thereby engage in CF. By tuning one’s 
mode of thought in response to the needs of the present 
moment, CF allowed information to be processed at different 
degrees of granularity, and from different perspectives.  
It is thus by way of CF that hominids became able to 
combine words into an infinite variety of sentences, to 
spontaneously change the direction of abstract thought, and 
to adapt behavior to changing circumstances. Individuals 
could engage in analytic thought as a default, but switch to 
associative thought when they were stuck, or when they 
wanted to express themselves or produce outputs that were 
aesthetically satisfying. Associative thought enabled them to 
connect ideas in new ways, resulting in creative ideas. These 
new mental combinations resulted in advanced tools, 
elaborate burials, and many forms of art and jewelry. 
Creativity, Evolution, ADHD, and Schizophrenia 
Further support for the proposal that FOXP2 played a role in 
the creative explosion of the Paleolithic and the onset of 
complex language comes from the literature on 
schizophrenia and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder 
(ADHD). Attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) 
is a common psychiatric disorder with symptoms of 
inattention, hyperactivity, and/or impulsivity that occurs in 
approximately 4–5% of children and persists into adulthood 
in at least 30% of patients diagnosed during infancy (Ribases 
et al., 2012). Genes that contribute to the acquisition of 
reading and spelling skills and play a role in speech and 
language are strong candidates to be involved in both ADHD 
and learning problems. FOXP2 affects activity of the 
corticobasal ganglia circuits known to contribute to ADHD 
(Ribases et al., 2012). 
Schizophrenia is a serious mental disorder characterized 
by delusions, hallucinations, disorganized speech, catatonia, 
paranoia, keen interest in religion, emotional flattening, and 
creativity. Hallucinations may take the form of verbal 
running commentary, or multiple voices conversing with 
each other. There is evidence that neural connections that 
predispose one to schizophrenia contribute to creativity 
(Cropley & Sikand, 1973). Genes that affect the dorsolateral 
prefrontal and orbitofrontal cortices differently individuals 
with schizophrenia exhibit positive selection for differential 
expression between humans and chimpanzees (Morgan, 
2013). Moreover, a polymorphism in FOXP2 can cause 
language deficits in patients with schizophrenia, suggesting 
that increased risk of schizophrenia is the price Homo 
sapiens pay for language and creativity (Sanjuan, Tolosa, 
Dagnall, Molto, & de Frutos, 2010). Moreover, 
schizophrenia is sometimes associated with both language 
impairment and above-average creativity (Kuttner Lorincz, 
& Swan, 1967). These findings suggest that the creative 
explosion of the Middle-Upper Paleolithic including the 
onset of complex language may have indirectly selected for 
genes involved in schizophrenia. 
Discussion 
The overall thread of our argument is synthesized in Figure 
3. We propose that a form of FOXP2 that evolved during the 
Paleolithic was responsible for the neurological 
underpinnings of the ability to shift between associative and 
analytic modes of thought. This enabled hominids to process 
information at multiple levels of detail and from different 
perspectives. It generated a need to think through and 
communicate complex thoughts. This brought selective 
pressure for the capacity to express oneself, thereby creating 
an environment conducive to the emergence of complex 
language including recursion, grammar, word inflections, 
syntactical structure, and comprehension.  
The proposal is consistent with findings that FOXP2 is 
associated with cognitive abilities that do not involve 
language, and with findings that non-language creative 
abilities arose at approximately the same time as complex 
language. The argument is also consistent with the view that 
what is at the core of our uniquely human cognitive abilities 
is the capacity to place things in context, or see things from 
different perspectives (Gabora & Kaufman, 2010). This 
enables us to put our own spin on the inventions of others, 
modifying them to suit our own needs and tastes, leading to 
new innovations that build cumulatively on previous ones. It 
permits us to modify thoughts, impressions, and attitudes by 
thinking about them in the context of each other, and 
weaving them into an integrated structure that defines who 
we are in relation to the world. Our compunction to put our 
own spin on the ideas and inventions of others results in 
accumulative cultural change, referred to as the ratchet effect 
(Tomasello, Kruger, & Ratner, 1993). 
 
Figure 1: Schematic illustration of the proposed relationship 
between FOXP2, language, and contextual focus.  
The picture presented here is speculative and incomplete. 
Likely other genes play a role in the capacity for CF, and 
other cognitive mechanisms are involved. Future research 
will aim at developing means of testing the hypothesis, and 
elucidating the neural mechanisms by which FOXP2 could 
enable a shift between different modes of thought during 
different phases of problem solving and other creative tasks. 
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